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Several commentators have advocated for a new cause of
action against medical care providers who fail to appropriately treat
1
pain. The commentators base their advocacy on recognition from
new research and advances in pain treatment that provide a better
understanding of how to adequately treat pain. The research
provides guidelines for more successful treatment and
management of pain, and establishes that previous fear about
2
opioids may have been overestimated. This new research also
3
revealed that pain is grossly undertreated in the United States.
1. See Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More
Excuses, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 33-41 (2001) (addressing tort liability for
inadequate pain management and discussing several possible theories for plaintiff
recovery); Gilah R. Mayer, Bergman v. Chin: Why an Elder Abuse Case is a Stride in the
Direction of Civil Culpability for Physicians Who Undertreat Patients Suffering from
Terminal Pain, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 313, 314 (2003) (advocating that courts impose
medical practice guidelines for the treatment of pain); Ben A. Rich, A Prescription
for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (2000) (advocating that new clinical practice guidelines be used as
appropriate standard of care in inadequate pain management medical malpractice
suits); Tonya Eippert, Note, A Proposal to Recognize a Legal Obligation on Physicians to
Provide Adequate Medication to Alleviate Pain, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 381, 402 (1998)
(proposing that courts recognize a medical malpractice claim when a physician
fails to render adequate pain relief and objective evidence establishes the
existence of pain); Jacob B. Nist, Note, Liability for Overprescription of Controlled
Substances: Can it be Justified in Light of the Current Practice of Undertreating Pain?, 23 J.
LEGAL MED. 85, 86 (2002) (discussing “the prevalence of prescription drug
addiction” and proposing that physicians should only be held liable for
inadequate treatment of pain if the physician acted in bad faith); Rima J. Oken,
Note, Curing Healthcare Providers’ Failure to Administer Opioids in the Treatment of
Severe Pain, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1917, 1923 (2002) (presenting model legislation
holding healthcare providers liable for providing inadequate palliative care to
their patients); Michael J. Reynolds, Note, Morphine or Malpractice: Should Courts
Recognize a Legal Duty to Prescribe Opiates for Treating Chronic Pain, 15 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMM. 79, 81 (2000) (concluding it is necessary for the courts to provide a
remedy for inadequate pain treatment).
2. The term “opioids” has replaced the terms “narcotics,” and “coanalgesics.” Opioids bind to opioid receptors in the central nervous system, which
modify the sensory and affective aspects of pain.
3. See generally Kathleen Murphy-Ende, Barriers to Palliative and Supportive
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The commentators present arguments on two fronts in their
articles. First, now that new standards for the treatment of pain
have been formulated and shown to work and that physician fear
related to opioid addiction has been shown to be overstated,
physicians who treat pain should be held to a duty to adequately
treat their patient’s pain. Second, the courts, through malpractice
cases, should force the adoption of the new practices by imposing
them now as the standards of care, thus holding physicians liable
4
when a patient unnecessarily suffers pain. One scholar advocates
legislative changes, including tort liability, for failure to adhere to
5
the new standards. Several other scholars advocate for recognition
of the new standards in courts and for holding physicians liable by
expanding common law medical malpractice theories to include
6
inadequate pain treatment.
The basic premise of the scholar-advocates for tort liability in
the area of inadequate pain treatment is the necessity of pressuring
physicians to respond more quickly to advances in pain
7
management techniques. Each scholar notes that medical schools
8
have failed to adequately train new physicians in pain management
and that physicians are traditionally biased toward undertreating
9
pain because of unfounded fears of opioid addiction.
The
scholars also argue that the pressure of potential tort liability is
necessary to counteract other influences that discourage physicians
from adequately prescribing opioids, such as potential criminal
liability, civil liability, and state medical board disciplinary actions
Care, 36 NURSING CLINICS OF N. AM. 843 (2001) (discussing the need for advances
in pain management for end-of-life care); Marylin Frank-Stromborg & Anjeanette
Christensen, A Serious Look at the Undertreatment of Pain: Part II, 5 CLINICAL J. OF
ONCOLOGY NURSING 276 (2001) (contrasting the need for complete pain
management with the risk of overtreatment); Rich, supra note 1; Francis X.
Mahaney, Jr., Proper Relief of Cancer Pain is Worldwide Concern, 87 J. NAT’L CANCER
INST. 481 (1995).
4. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 33-34 (discussing courts’ role in adopting new
standards of care by imposing new guidelines in malpractice cases).
5. Oken, supra note 1, at 1992.
6. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 43; Mayer, supra note 1, at 316; Rich, supra
note 1, at 2-3; Eippert, supra note 1, at 399-404; Nist, supra note 1, at 111; Reynolds,
supra note 1, at 80.
7. See sources cited supra note 6.
8. Furrow, supra note 1, at 28; Mayer, supra note 1, at 313; Rich, supra note 1,
at 14-21; Eippert, supra note 1, at 390-91; Nist, supra note 1, at 93; Oken, supra note
1, at 1933; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 88.
9. Furrow, supra note 1, at 28; Mayer, supra note 1, at 321; Rich, supra note 1,
at 42-44; Eippert, supra note 1, at 386-88; Nist, supra note 1, at 87-88; Oken, supra
note 1, at 1936-38; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 88-89.
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10

for overprescribing.
An additional issue alluded to by some scholars who advocate
for broader tort liability relates to the care of patients who are
11
terminally ill and in pain, but receive inadequate pain treatment.
In these circumstances, physicians have to consider the additional
factor that opioids have the potential to kill the already-weakened
12
patient. Some scholars argue that physicians have an affirmative
duty to relieve a terminal patient’s pain despite the risk of
13
hastening the patient’s death. They also argue that courts should
14
However, this implicates significant issues
impose this duty.
relating to physician-assisted suicide, a patient’s right to die, and
moral choices made by physicians when determining whether they
are willing to take affirmative actions that could do harm.
Although the Supreme Court held that “a patient has a
constitutionally protected right to palliative care, even if such care
15
has the ultimate effect of hastening death,” the Court did not go
so far as finding an affirmative duty to provide palliative care that
16
could result in the untimely death of the patient. At first glance,
tort liability for inadequate pain treatment is appealing because it
would theoretically pressure physicians to adopt the most current
standards for pain treatment that should, in turn, help alleviate a
patient’s pain. However, tort liability does not account for the
underlying causes of the problem; it simply exerts an additional
pressure on physicians. In this case, additional pressure might not
be an appropriate solution. Physicians are currently fearful of
overprescribing opioids due to the potential for disciplinary actions
and criminal proceedings, in addition to fears of possibly harming
17
their patient. A tort cause of action would do nothing to ease
10. Furrow, supra note 1, at 28; Mayer, supra note 1, at 324-25; Rich, supra
note 1, at 44-55; Eippert, supra note 1, at 401; Nist, supra note 1, at 85; Oken, supra
note 1, at 1943-46; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 82-86.
11. Furrow, supra note 1, at 28; Mayer, supra note 1, at 313; Rich, supra note 1,
at 6-14; Nist, supra note 1, at 87; Oken, supra note 1, at 1921; Reynolds, supra note
1, at 79-80.
12. See Myra Glajchen, Chronic Pain: Treatment Barriers and Strategies for Clinical
Practice, 14 J. AM. BD. OF FAM. PRAC. 211, 216 (2001) (respiratory depression is an
unwanted side effect of opioid therapy).
13. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 341; Oken, supra note 1, at 1992.
14. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 341; Oken, supra note 1, at 1992.
15. Oken, supra note 1, at 1956.
16. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801-03 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 736-38 (1997).
17. See generally David A. Fleming, Relieving Pain: What Are Today’s Ethical and
Legal Risks?, 99 MO. MED. 560, 560 (2002).
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these fears. Rather, it would simply add an additional fear that
could leave physicians feeling as though pain treatment is
professionally untenable.
Other factors weigh against adding a cause of action for
inadequate pain treatment. Inadequate pain treatment does not fit
within the traditional notion of medical malpractice because a
patient could not say that the physician caused the pain. Rather,
the physician simply failed to alleviate the patient’s pre-existing
pain. In addition, pain is completely subjective—there is no
diagnostic test a physician (or the courts) can use to verify the
18
existence or amount of pain an individual is suffering —thus, pain
is not certain enough to allow tort liability. Finally, tort liability for
inadequate pain treatment could result in fewer physicians
practicing pain management and thereby increase the costs of pain
treatment. The net result may be that some patients will not
receive any treatment for their pain.
Part I of this note reviews current issues relating to pain
19
treatment. Part II examines theoretical justifications of proposed
20
tort liability for inadequate pain management. Part III examines
how pain mismanagement does not fit within traditional notions of
21
medical malpractice.
Part IV studies the issues relating to a
physician’s role as “gate-keeper” for opioids and suggests why tort
22
liability could compromise this legislatively imposed role. Part V
examines the issue of pain management in the context of end-of23
life care.
Part VI discusses current shifts in pain management
philosophies and explains how these movements will effectuate the
24
changes suggested by advocates of expanded tort liability.
I.

THE TREATMENT OF PAIN

The underlying problem is that medical professionals have not
kept their pain management practices and beliefs up to date with

18. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS,
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF PAIN MANAGEMENT THROUGH MEASUREMENT AND ACTION
4 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.jcaho.org/news+room/health+care+issues/
pain+mono_jc.pdf [hereinafter JCAHO Pain Assessment].
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part VI.
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25

the current research regarding pain treatment. Clinical research
by pain management specialists has established that traditional
26
fears of patient addiction to opioids are largely unfounded. This
research also establishes that the traditional method of pain
treatment on a “PRN” (as needed) basis is not the proper
27
approach. Instead, research has shown that optimum pain relief
is obtained by providing continuous baseline dosages, which not
only require smaller doses of opioids because the pain never
“breaks through,” but also provide substantially greater pain relief
because the patient does not have to suffer pain in order to obtain
28
pain relief. However, this methodology has not found its way into
mainstream medical practice. The majority of physicians still
29
prescribe opioids on a PRN basis. In addition, the majority of
physicians do not aggressively treat pain with controlled opioids out
of fears of addiction and fears of criminal and professional
30
sanctions for over prescribing opioids.
Medical professionals are forced to choose between many
competing priorities when managing a patient’s pain. The first
priority is to minimize the patient’s pain. The second priority is to
minimize the potential harm to the patient and to the physician.
The potential harms include: patient addiction to opioid
analgesics, premature patient death due to inhibition of
respirations in weakened patients, compromised mental status of
the patient, diversion of controlled substances from the patient to a
drug abuser, abuse of controlled substances acquired fraudulently
31
by patients, administrative discipline, and criminal and/or civil
32
liability for the physician for providing abused drugs.
One factor often cited to explain why physicians have not
changed their pain treatment practices is that medical schools do
33
not provide adequate training in pain management. In addition,
25. Richard Penson et al., Trust Violated: Analgesics for Addicts, 8 THE
ONCOLOGIST 199, 205 (2003).
26. See JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17.
27. See Glajchen, supra note 12 at 213-14.
28. See id. (long-acting opioids, administered at regular intervals, reduce
peak-and-trough effects found with short-acting opioids).
29. See Fleming, supra note 17.
30. Id.
31. See Glajchen, supra note 12, at 216-17.
32. See JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17.
33. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 28; Mayer, supra note 1, at 320 n.64; Rich,
supra note 1, at 5; Eippert, supra note 1, at 390-91; Nist, supra note 1, at 95; Oken,
supra note 1, at 1933-34; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 88.
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current standards of care do not adequately reflect advancements
in pain management. This results in new doctors learning the
34
same misinformation from prior generations. A related factor is
that “[m]edical regulators, such as state licensing boards, have not
been as concerned about the care of an individual patient as they
have been about protecting the public from inappropriate medical
35
practices, such as the over prescribing of controlled substances.”
“[M]edical board members generally are aware that prescription
drugs are abused with greater frequency than either heroin or
marijuana. Consequently, these boards sometimes scrutinize the
prescribing practices of physicians who order controlled substances
36
to treat their patients’ pain.” In addition to state regulators, the
federal government plays a role. “[T]he DEA’s [Drug Enforcement
Agency] law enforcement mindset . . . [gives] perhaps undue
weight to the negative externalities associated with access to
37
narcotics and not trusting health care professionals.” The effect
of this increased scrutiny on physicians’ prescribing practices has
been to significantly discourage physicians from prescribing
38
opioids to treat their patients’ pain.
This is related to what may be the most significant barrier to
effective pain control: the fear of addiction.
[T]here exists generally in today’s society a major concern
about narcotic addiction. This understandable cultural
concern is unfortunately also reflected in the medical
community’s approach to treating patients suffering with
pain. Many medical practitioners have justified their
refusal to administer analgesics to patients in pain by
adhering to their fear that the patient will become
39
addicted to the medication.
To some extent this is attributable to physician confusion
about physical dependence versus addiction. Physical dependence
is an expected side effect of long-term opioid use and is often
characterized by drug “tolerance and is manifested by a drug class

34. See sources cited supra note 33.
35. Frank-Stromborg, supra note 3, at 276.
36. Id.
37. Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management
Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 64 (2003).
38. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 33; Mayer, supra note 1, at 324-25; Rich, supra
note 1, at 43; Eippert, supra note 1, at 387-88; Nist, supra note 1, at 87; Oken, supra
note 1, at 1944-46; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 83-84.
39. Eippert, supra note 1, at 387 (citations omitted).
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specific withdrawal syndrome that can be produced by . . .
40
Addiction, on the other
decreasing blood level of the drug.”
hand, “is characterized by behaviors that include one or more of
the following: impaired control over drug use, compulsive use,
41
continued use despite harm, and craving.” Opioid addiction is a
valid fear, but “[i]n general, patients in pain do not become
42
addicted to opioids.” For example, in the case of cancer pain, no
study demonstrates that prescribing opioids for cancer pain
43
contributes to addiction or drug-abuse problems.
Thus,
physicians’ unfounded fears substantially contribute to their
practice of inadequate pain management. However, although
addiction rates are lower than historically believed, there is still the
potential for patients to become addicted to opioids as “studies
report drug abuse/dependence/addiction in 3 to 19 percent of
44
chronic pain patients.”
In addition, the abuse of pain-relieving drugs is a
phenomenon that is growing at a staggering rate in the United
States. The latest research indicates that the number of new painreliever abusers increased more than four fold between 1990 and
45
46
2000 to a level equivalent to that of new marijuana abusers. To
put this growth in perspective, between 1990 and 2000 only ecstasy
47
added new users/abusers at a higher rate.
Thus, while there
appears to be limited problems with pain reliever addiction by
sufferers of cancer and chronic pain, there is a substantial and
growing problem with the abuse of pain relieving drugs by nonmedical users/abusers.
Barriers from patients and their family can also work against
effective pain management. “Patients may be reluctant to report
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17.
Id.
Id.
Murphy-Ende, supra note 3, at 846.
Dawn A. Marcus, Treatment of Nonmalignant Chronic Pain, 61 AM. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 1331, 1337 (2002).
45. See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results
from the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings, Chapter 6,
Figure 6.3 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.drugabusestatistics.samhsa.gov/
nhsda/2k2nsduh/2k2SoFW.pdf [hereinafter 2002 Drug Survey] (stating “[p]ain
reliever incidence [of new non-medical users] increased from 1990, when there
were 628,000 initiates, to 2000, when there were 2.7 million”).
46. Id. Comparing Figure 6.1 with Figure 6.3 shows there were 2.4 million
new abusers of pain relievers versus 2.6 million new marijuana users in 2001. Id.
47. Id. Comparing Figure 6.2 with Figure 6.3 shows there were 168,000 new
users in 1993 versus 1.9 million in 2000–an increase of over eleven fold. Id.
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pain because they do not want to distract their physician from
treating the disease, for fear of injections, or because pain signifies
48
disease progression.” “[M]any patients and caregivers believe that
pain is an unavoidable consequence of cancer and do not attempt
49
to alleviate it.” “Misconceptions about addiction and tolerance
and concerns about opioid-related side effects, including
constipation, nausea, confusion, or drowsiness, may prevent
50
patients from taking prescribed medications.” Patient failure to
adhere to pain management plans due to forgetfulness can also
lead to poor pain control and has been identified as a major
51
barrier to effective pain management.
A patient’s personal
experience, cultural and religious beliefs, and attitudes toward pain
52
and medication may also affect pain management and reporting.
Finally, a lack of insurance coverage for many forms of long-term
pain-management treatments and drugs may prevent many patients
53
from gaining proper access to pain management. For example,
Medicare does not cover oral-prescription pain medication for
54
most outpatients.
A. Types of Pain
There are three basic categories of pain that are relevant to a
discussion regarding expanding tort liability for failing to
adequately treat pain: acute pain, chronic pain that is
nonmalignant, and pain that is associated with a terminal condition
55
such as cancer. Each type of pain requires varied considerations
by the medical professional treating the pain. One extreme is the
case of pain associated with a terminal or incurable condition,
where it is appropriate for the physician to stop aggressive curative
measures and to concentrate instead on palliation, which is
characterized by “a singular focus on maximizing the quality of the
48. Murphy-Ende, supra note 3, at 844.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 845.
51. Id.
52. See JCAHO Pain Assessement, supra note 18, at 16.
53. Diane E. Hoffmann, Pain Management and Palliative Care in the Era of
Managed Care: Issues for Health Insurers, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267, 267 (1998).
54. Jeff Grabmeier, Fear of Regulators Keeps Some Doctors from Good Pain
Treatment (Feb. 26, 1999), at http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/painman.htm.
55. There are other categories of pain that are relevant to medical diagnosis
and treatment, but are not directly relevant to a discussion of tort liability for
inadequate pain management.
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56

patient’s life.” In this case, fear of addiction or abuse should not
be significant considerations beyond their effect on the quality of
the patient’s remaining life. Another extreme is the case of acute
pain where there are other significant considerations. In the case
of acute pain, such as a rotator cuff injury, it is often necessary to
minimize pain treatment in order to promote healing of the
underlying problem because the opioids used to treat pain can
“produce lethargy, apathy, physical dependence[,] and depression”
57
that could interfere with healing. In other cases of acute pain,
such as postoperative pain, adequate pain management is essential
58
to promote healing. The final type of pain, chronic pain that is
nonmalignant, can pose the most significant challenge to the
physician because the pain treatment has to be balanced against
the potential for addiction, quality of life, and the potential for
59
diversion of opioids for illicit purposes. These different types of
pain are significant when considering a legal duty for physicians to
alleviate pain because in each circumstance the justification for
imposing a legal duty on the physician is different. At the same
time, consideration should also be given to the idea of not
imposing a legal duty on physicians to adequately control the
patient’s pain.
B. Prescription Drug Abuse and the War on Drugs
The “War on Drugs” and prescription drug abuse have had
significant impacts on physicians prescribing opioids and other
60
controlled substances. The social “evils” of drug abuse, including
61
prescription drug abuse, are regularly publicized in the media.
This has affected the public’s perception of opioids to the point
that there is a social stigma against their use. For example,

56. Rich, supra note 1, at 3.
57. Carlton Miller, Arthritis and the Role of the Physician in Nonmalignant Pain
and Disability, 16 J. HEALTH & SOC. POL’Y 33, 39 (2002).
58. See Benzion Beilin et al., The Effects of Postoperative Pain Management on
Immune Response to Surgery, 97 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 822, 826 (2003); see also
Inger F. Oey et al., Postoperative Pain Detracts from Early Health Status Improvement
Seen After Video-assisted Thoracoscopic Lung Volume Reduction Surgery, 24 EUR. J.
CARDIO-THORACIC SURGERY 588, 588 (2003).
59. See generally Glajchen, supra note 12.
60. See Gregory E. Skipper, The Oxycontin Dilemma, 16 ALA. BOARD OF MED.
EXAMINERS NEWSL. 1, 1 (Spring 2001), available at http://www.albme.org/
PDFs/NLSpg01.PDF.
61. Id.
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OxyContin has allowed many patients suffering from severechronic pain to carry on normal activities that were once
62
impossible due to the severity of their pain. However, OxyContin
has received significant “bad press” because of pharmacy robberies
and fatal overdoses linked to its abuse. In addition, OxyContin has
63
a substantial street value.
As a direct result, physicians are
cautious in prescribing OxyContin and some legitimate users are
64
Similarly, physicians are wary of
wary of continuing its use.
prescribing controlled substances to patients out of fear they are
65
being deceived as to the truth of the patient’s assertion of pain.
This fear is not unwarranted as “[p]atients deceiving their
physicians . . . constitute the largest percentage of controlled
66
substance abusers.”
Patients who deceive physicians to obtain controlled
67
substances are considered “drug seekers.” Behaviors commonly
exhibited by drug seekers include requesting specific narcotics,
inconsistencies between the patient’s reported level of pain and
what the physical exam indicates to the physician, and visiting
68
multiple physicians to obtain duplicate prescriptions. However, in
some situations it can be very difficult for a physician to distinguish
between a drug seeker and a true pain sufferer because they often
69
exhibit similar behaviors. “[P]suedoaddiction, refers to patient
behaviors that may occur when pain is undertreated, including
increased focus on obtaining medications (‘drug seeking’), ‘clock
70
watching,’ and even illicit drug use or deception.”
Pseudoaddiction can be distinguished from true addiction because
71
such behaviors resolve with effective pain management.”
Because some patients deceive their physician and

62. See Carolyn Kleiner, A Curse and a Cure, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 6,
2001, at 42.
63. See Skipper, supra note 60 (stating “[S]ixty 40mg tablets of OxyContin,
which retail for about $300, can bring $2400 on the black market.”).
64. See id.
65. See Penson, supra note 25, at 199-200.
66. See Nist, supra note 1, at 107 (citing Bonnie B. Wilford et al., An Overview
of Prescription Drug Misuse and Abuse: Defining the Problem and Seeking Solutions, 22 J.
L. MED. & ETHICS 197, 199 (1994)).
67. “Drug seeker” is derived from one who displays “drug-seeking” behavior.
See Penson, supra note 25, at 205.
68. See Glajchen, supra note 12, at 216-17.
69. See id. at 216.
70. JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17.
71. Id.
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fraudulently obtain controlled substances, physicians may look
beyond reported pain to the physician’s relationship and history
72
with the individual patient.
Physicians’ fear of prescribing
controlled substances is most pronounced when the patientphysician relationship is new and the patient’s pain is not
substantiated by either physical indication of injury or disease that
73
normally accompanies pain; or in the case of reported chronic
pain, where the patient does not provide adequate medical history
for the physician to verify the patient’s pain treatment history. In
these cases, the physician might refuse to prescribe a controlled
narcotic or only prescribe a limited quantity of opioids sufficient to
74
allow the patient time to substantiate their medical history.
II. TRADITIONAL TORT JUSTIFICATIONS DO NOT WARRANT
LIABILITY FOR INADEQUATE PAIN MANAGEMENT
There are two theoretical justifications that underlie the tort
system: “utilitarianism and those based upon individual moral
75
rights.” Utilitarian justifications focus on using tort law as a tool
to implement social or public policy goals, such as deterrence by
76
imposing the threat of liability on tortfeasors. Justifications that
focus on individual moral rights view tort law as a way of achieving
justice between parties, such as compensation for harms wrongly
77
imposed by a tortfeasor. Some scholars believe that only one or
the other justification for the tort system is correct while other
scholars argue that the tort system incorporates elements of both
78
justifications. In the context of pain management, the scholars

72. See Glajchen, supra note 12, at 216-17.
73. See Eippert, supra note 1, at 389 (suggesting that tort liability should only
be imposed where the existence of pain can be established through objective
evidence).
74. See Watkins v. U.S., 589 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding physician has
duty to investigate history of mental illness when prescribing large amounts of a
controlled substance to a patient). If there is a duty to investigate a patient’s
mental history, then it is likely a court could find a duty to investigate a patient’s
substance abuse history before prescribing large amounts of a controlled
substance to such a patient. Id.
75. Jeffrey O’Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in
Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and
Patrick Atiyah, 32 CONN. L. REV. 137, 138 (1999) (citing Stephen R. Perry, The Moral
Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 449 (1992)).
76. O’Connell & Robinette, supra note 75 at 138.
77. Id. at 138-39.
78. See generally id.
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advocating tort liability for inadequate pain management base their
arguments primarily on the utilitarian justification of changing the
medical practice through tort liability and secondarily on the
individual’s right to compensation for pain that should not have
79
been suffered had it been properly treated by the physician.
A. The Utilitarian Justification
The basic utilitarian justification offered in support of tort
80
liability for inadequate pain management is that tort liability will
force physicians to adopt new standards of pain management and
help overcome other factors that contribute to physicians’
decisions that result in undertreatment of pain.
1. Can Tort Liability Change Medical Practice Regarding Pain
Management?
The argument that tort liability will force physicians to adopt
new standards of pain management is fundamentally based,
although not explicitly expressed, on previous changes that tort
liability has arguably generated upon medical practice.
There are many examples of tort liability, where courts have
arguably effectuated changes in the practice of medicine by
adopting new standards of care. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the
81
University of California, the California Supreme Court held a
therapist to a duty to warn potential victims after his patient
expressed a serious and credible intent to harm those persons.
“According to a study . . . Tarasoff was effective in rendering
psychiatrists and psychologists, especially in California,
considerably more willing to notify potential victims and also public
82
authorities when dealing with dangerous patients.”
83
Helling v. Carey “found malpractice as a matter of law
whenever a doctor does not include a glaucoma pressure test
84
A study found that the level of
within a routine eye exam.”
routine glaucoma testing of patients under age forty by Washington
ophthalmologists went up by a substantial percentage in the years
79. See sources cited supra note 1.
80. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 379 (1994).
81. 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
82. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 399-400.
83. 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974).
84. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 400.
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85

following the decision.
Another area of medicine that tort liability has changed is the
surgical precautions taken to prevent leaving a surgical tool in a
86
patient, which frequently leads to malpractice actions.
“[T]o
prevent such lawsuits and better protect patients, hospitals are
prescribing a variety of new operating-room procedures, from
computerizing the way they keep track of surgical tools to bearing
down on doctors who seem overly eager to close up a patient
87
before all tools have been accounted for.”
The informed consent doctrine is often cited as a primary
example of how tort liability can generate beneficial change in
88
medicine. Studies based on a Canadian opinion that broadened a
doctor’s duty to provide informed consent found that sixty percent
of the surgeons who had been made aware of the decision chose to
modify their practice to spend more time discussing surgical risks
89
with patients. A Harvard study of New York physicians showed
that “during the previous decade the threat of liability led almost
seventy-eight percent of physicians to spend more time ‘explaining
90
risks’ to patients.”
In each of these examples, it is arguable that judicially
imposed tort liability changed the medical profession by altering
the physician’s standard of care. In each case, the judicially
imposed duty required medical professionals to take additional
action that was not previously part of the standard of care. In some
respects, a court mandating a broader standard of care for pain
management is similar. However, the standard of care for pain
management is a significantly more complex issue than the
examples cited. Each example concerned a very specific obligation
that was imposed on doctors that was easily measurable, potentially
91
as a matter of law.
A court cannot mandate how a physician
should treat pain because each patient requires individual
considerations. A court cannot simply mandate that a physician
has an obligation to provide opioids to any patient claiming

85. Id.
86. Id. at 399.
87. Id. at 399 (quoting Edward Felsenthal, Forgotten Surgical Tools Spur
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1992, at B12).
88. Id. at 401.
89. Id. at 400-01.
90. Id. at 401.
91. Id.
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92

sufficient pain, as this would be illegal.
In addition, a court
cannot mandate what the standard of care for pain management
should be, especially in light of the level of detail required for
determining an individual case because there is not a single
standard of care—it varies from case to case. “Many strategies exist
93
to manage various types of pain.”
There are a multitude of practice guidelines in existence, and
they only provide generalities, not specific treatment protocols. As
an example, JCAHO recently stated that “[s]ystem barriers to pain
assessment and management include an absence of clearly
94
articulated practice standards,” despite documenting thirty-one
separate clinical practice guidelines that had been produced by
various organizations between 1992 and 2000 to specify how to
95
treat pain in various situations.
If one of the barriers to pain
management is the lack of clearly articulated practice standards,
then it is clearly unreasonable to expect a court to impose an
effective standard of care based on existing clinical practice
guidelines that physicians follow today in avoiding tort liability.
Thus, it is unlikely that a court would be able to effectuate the type
of systematic change that may have been shown in previous cases by
simply dictating the standard of care to the medical profession.
2. Can Tort Liability Overcome Other Factors that Contribute to the
Undertreatment of Pain?
Perhaps the most unsupported proposition by the proponents
of tort liability for inadequate pain treatment is the scholars’
assertion that tort liability will overcome other factors that
96
contribute to the undertreatment of pain. However, none of the
scholars support this conclusion with direct evidence; it is only a
97
logical assumption that is made. Deterrence is the basic method
through which tort liability can produce utilitarian changes on
92. See infra Part IV.A and note 167 (Only a physician can make the
determination that the use of a controlled substance is for a “legitimate medical
purpose.”).
93. JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18.
94. Id. at 15.
95. Id. at 75.
96. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 350 (stating that “the impact of the [Bergman
v. Chin, No. H205732-1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2001)] case will serve to improve
treatment of all patients suffering needlessly from pain”); Oken, supra note 1, at
1968-69, 1981; Nist, supra note 1, at 87-88; Furrow, supra note 1, at 28-31.
97. See supra note 96.
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society. “By imposing the threat of liability on tortious conduct, the
98
law can discourage parties from engaging in that conduct.” In the
case of pain management, the goal of tort liability would be to
deter undertreatment in the face of preexisting substantial
deterrence for overtreatment.
In the case of medical malpractice, it is questionable how
much tort liability truly deters negligence due to the liability
insurance that most physicians carry. Typically, physicians are not
personally held financially responsible for adverse medical
malpractice decisions or the litigation costs associated with a
99
medical malpractice claims.
There is limited indirect pressure
created by malpractice insurers because the insurers usually do not
base malpractice premiums on past claims of individual
100
physicians.
In the case of physicians, malpractice premiums are
101
calculated based on broad specialty groupings. Thus, tort liability
does not directly deter physicians. However, without any doubt,
tort liability has some indirect deterrent effect on physicians.
[T]he threat of tort litigation has a substantial
psychological impact on physicians in excess of the
diluted financial incentives created.
Physicians
overestimate the risk of being sued and the size of feared
judgments. The sheer unpleasantness of being sued also
deters, although it has been argued that the lack of clarity
as to the locus of negligence in most cases does not
102
provide useful feedback to providers.
In order for tort liability to deter undertreatment of pain, it
would have to overcome the physician’s fears of disciplinary action
and criminal prosecution that have contributed to the physician’s
decision to undertreat pain.
Doctors’ fears of disciplinary action and criminal
prosecution are justified. There is no evidence that large
numbers of physicians are sanctioned for their treatment
of patients in pain, but the impact of the process on those
physicians who are only investigated, or only charged but
not disciplined, or only warned or cautioned but not
98. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 381.
99. This is, of course, true where insurance covers negligent behavior of any
kind.
100. See Skipper, supra note 60; see also SCOTT BECKER, HEALTH CARE LAW: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE § 12.06, 1-12 (2d ed. 2003).
101. BECKER, supra note 100.
102. Furrow, supra note 1, at 30.
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penalized is severe. The prosecutorial stance stimulated
by a “war on drugs” and by increasing public scrutiny of
disciplinary agencies may unintentionally interfere with
adequate pain relief because it has intensified and
criminalized investigations and later proceedings.
Descriptions of the investigation of physicians engaged in
the treatment of pain patients with controlled substances
present a scenario that would easily intimidate most
people. Some evidence also suggests that many state
medical boards have not adapted to more current
approaches to the use of controlled substances in pain
management and that they may rely solely or too heavily
on dosage and length of treatment as indicators of
inappropriate and illegitimate prescription practices . . . .
State disciplinary boards are also involved, often in
collaboration with criminal prosecutors, in the war against
drugs, penalizing providers who prescribe controlled
substances that can be diverted to street use or who
103
themselves deal drugs using their prescriptive authority.
There is no evidence that the deterrence effect of tort liability can
overcome or even mitigate the deterrence effect of imprisonment
or loss of medical license that has deterred so many physicians into
playing it safe—and, in effect, undertreating pain.
An additional factor in this equation of deterrence is that
physicians perceive that the medical malpractice system is not
entirely fair and accurate. To some extent, there is the belief that
juries do not have the education or training to fairly evaluate
whether a physician’s decision was proper and that juries instead
are sympathetic with injured patients and view physicians, hospitals,
and their insurers as deep pockets that can afford to compensate
the sympathetic patient. To the extent that physicians view the
medical malpractice system as a “litigation lottery,” its potential to
104
deter physician conduct is limited.
It is arguable that one of the
main effects of medical malpractice on the practice of medicine is
105
to encourage physicians to practice “defensive medicine.”
This
practice involves ordering tests and treatments that are only
minimally indicated or not cost effective in the judgment of the

103. Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain
Relief Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 319, 320 (1996).
104. Theresa M. Hottenroth, Lessons From Canada: A Prescription for Medical
Liability Reform, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 285, 288 (1994).
105. Id. at 289.
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physician.
Nevertheless, they are ordered either to create
information predominately for future litigation purposes or
alternatively because the patient threatens to sue the physician in
106
order to have the test/procedure performed.
The main
disincentive to defensive medicine is that it increases the cost of
health care for everyone; whereas the physician is encouraged to
107
practice defensively by the more personal threat of litigation.
The phenomenon of defensive medicine to some extent
reflects the disdain that physicians have for the jury as a decision
maker: the physician practices defensive medicine because he or
she does not trust that the jury will come to what the physician
considers a proper medical judgment regarding whether a test or
procedure was warranted given the information available to the
108
physician when the decision was made. One worry is that the jury
will improperly make a post hoc determination of whether the test
or procedure was warranted based on the result of the decision.
This effect of limited deterrence of civil judgments could be
especially pronounced in a physician’s determination of how to
treat pain because it likely indicates that more weight will be given
to factors such as state medical boards, hospital regulations, and
perceived criminal liability than to what a civil court says.
3. What Side Effects Could Tort Liability Have if Imposed for
Inadequate Pain Management?
To justify expanded tort liability based on utilitarian goals, it is
essential to examine the complete effect tort liability could have on
pain management. A significant disadvantage to tort liability for
mismanaging pain is that it may decrease the overall availability of
pain management and increase the cost of pain management.
It will be expensive to litigate cases of pain mismanagement.
Expensive expert testimony will be required by both parties in
order to determine if the defendant’s conduct complied with or
109
deviated from the standard of care. There are situations in which
pain cannot be clinically controlled regardless of what treatment is

106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See BECKER, supra note 100 (indicating that a court could not articulate a
standard of care for pain management that precludes the need for expert
testimony to establish the standard of care).
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110

used,
requiring additional expert testimony regarding the
efficacy of treating the patient’s pain. In addition, complete pain
elimination is not the goal of opioid use when treating chronic
111
pain.
This will also require expert testimony to determine
whether the optimum level of pain relief was achieved. Another
factor is that the subjective nature of pain will require additional
expert testimony to establish whether the plaintiff actually suffered
pain. The subjective nature of pain will also make it difficult to
dispose of trivial or frivolous claims by summary judgment motions,
as the injury to the plaintiff and appropriateness of the physician’s
response will be factual, not legal issues. In addition, the number
of people suffering from pain in the United States is substantial.
“Each year, an estimated 25 million Americans experience acute
pain due to injury or surgery and another 50 million suffer chronic
112
pain.” The sheer number of people suffering some form of pain
in the United States could result in a flood of litigation given the
current inadequacies of pain management practices and the
113
supposition that ten percent of chronic pain is uncontrollable.
Finally, inadequate pain management has the potential for high
114
damage awards. The potential for high damage awards may lead
to high pretrial settlement costs because plaintiffs will have a high
expectation for the value of their claims.
Physicians’ medical malpractice insurance policies will most
likely cover the costs of litigation and damage awards. As a result,
insurance companies will have to raise insurance premiums to
cover these new expenses. Insurance companies will likely raise all
110. Rich, supra note 1, at 7 (“There is a strong consensus that . . . ninety
percent of all pain experienced by patients can be relieved.”). This implies that
ten percent of all pain cannot be relieved.
111. Marcus, supra note 44.
112. JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 3; see also Rich, supra note 1, at
15 (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, CHRONIC PAIN: HOPE THROUGH
RESEARCH, Pub. No. 90-2406, 2-3 (1989) (noting a 1989 study found that “five
million Americans suffer[ed] from back pain alone, of which two million [were]
so disabled they [could not] work.”)).
113. See Hottenroth, supra note 104, at 7 and accompanying text.
114. See Terrie Lewis, Perspectives on Elder Law: Pain Management for the Elderly,
29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 223, 235, 237 (2002) (In 1990, a North Carolina jury
ordered a nursing home to pay $7.5 million in compensatory damages and $7.5
million in punitive damages for not providing a patient pain medication for three
days. In 1998, a California jury awarded $1.5 million for under-medicating a
patient’s pain for five days as he was dying from lung cancer under an elder abuse
statute); see also Oken, supra note 1, at 1979 (stating “[J]urors will make physicians
pay heavily for needless patient suffering”).
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physicians’ premiums, not just those of the physicians being sued
because “insurers cannot and do not vary premiums very much
according to accident record. It is too complex, and too unreliable
115
statistically.”
However, insurance companies would likely
respond by creating a new practice category for insurance
coverage, allowing them to charge additional premiums only to
116
physicians who practice pain management, and these additional
117
This could result in
premiums would likely be significant.
physicians choosing not to practice pain management to avoid
additional and potentially significant malpractice premiums.
Tort liability also has the potential to place the doctor in a nowin situation. The standards a court could impose on physicians
would not necessarily be compatible with existing state criminal
standards or federal standards. An example is the New York State
Controlled Substance Act, which defines an addict as being “a
person who habitually uses a narcotic drug and who by reason of
118
such use is dependent thereon.”
“That statute prohibits
physicians from prescribing controlled substances to an ‘addict’
unless that person is a patient of the physician and is suffering from
119
an incurable and fatal disease.”
“[A] narrow and rigid
interpretation of such statutory language would likely preclude a
physician from effectively controlling the chronic pain of patients
120
whose condition could not be labeled terminal.”
However, most
pain management guidelines specify that opioids should not be
121
withheld from patients who are addicted.
A judicially imposed
standard of care and duty for physicians to relieve pain would likely
not take into account specific statutory restrictions on physicians
such as the New York State Controlled Substance Act. Ambiguous
language in the statute, combined with generalities from the
standard of care, could place physicians in a situation where they
115. O’Connell & Robinette, supra note 75, at 147.
116. See BECKER, supra note 100.
117. The high premiums would be based on the high cost of defense, large
awards, large settlement value, and a very large number of pain sufferers who
could file suit if an action for inadequate treatment of pain were recognized.
118. Rich, supra note 1, at 46-47 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3302(1)
(McKinney 1993)).
119. Id. at 47.
120. Id.
121. See Sidney H. Schnoll & Michael F. Weaver, Addiction and Pain, 12 AM. J.
ON ADDICTION §27, §33 (2003); see also Mitchell J. Cohen et al., Ethical Perspectives:
Opioids Treatment of Chronic Pain in the Context of Addiction, 18 CLINICAL J. OF PAIN
§99, §106 (2002).
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would be unsure of whether they could treat a patient.
Higher insurance rates and a hostile tort environment could
122
cause physicians to leave the practice of pain management.
Alternatively, a hostile climate for practicing pain management in a
particular state could encourage physicians practicing pain
123
management to move to a less hostile state.
It is likely that only physicians who practice a significant
amount of pain management would continue the practice given a
124
significant new expense.
For example, the threat of liability and
the cost of insurance have resulted in “a number of general
practitioners in rural areas [refusing] to deliver babies, imposing
on their patients the inconvenience of seeking obstetric care in a
125
distant metropolitan area.”
The likely result of higher costs for
medical malpractice insurance would be fewer physicians
practicing pain management and higher health care costs for pain
126
management.
This would likely result in more patients suffering unnecessary
pain due to difficulties in finding a physician to treat their pain. As
of 2002, “with just over 1,000 pain management specialists
practicing in the United States, patients would have difficulty
getting prescriptions for needed drugs if only such specialists were
127
permitted to prescribe them.”
In addition to a shortage of pain
122. Physicians are not required to practice pain management. Oken, supra
note 1, at 1989 (“Physicians have every right to say ‘I don’t do palliative care,’ and
send patients elsewhere.”).
123. See Christopher Guadagnino, Physician Shortage in Pennsylvania?,
PHYSICIANS NEW DIGEST (August 2003) (explaining surging malpractice insurance
costs coupled with low private insurer reimbursements relative to other states
resulted in Pennsylvania physicians leaving the state, retiring early, or dropping
risky procedures); see also Scott Shepard, Malpractice Costs Driving Doctors Away,
MEMPHIS BUS. J., available at http://www.phg.com/articlepf_a021.htm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2005) (claiming “crushing costs” for medical malpractice and slow and
inconvenient state medical licensing procedures are driving physicians from
Mississippi and discouraging others from taking their place).
124. There is an additional factor that could lead physicians to leave the
practice of pain management: the “hassle factor” of dealing with drug seekers.
125. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 403.
126. The counter argument to this is that it would be beneficial for pain to
only be managed by experts who would provide the best standard of care for their
patients. However, while it is self-evident that specialists in pain management are
best suited to deal with the more difficult cases of pain, there is no evidence that
other physicians, with proper training, are unable to treat the majority of simple
cases. In addition, given the number of patients suffering from pain, the result of
a specialist providing medical care instead of a primary care physician is an
increase in the overall health care costs of pain management.
127. Noah, supra note 37, at 64.
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management specialists, the United States is currently experiencing
128
Increased costs compounded
a general shortage of physicians.
with existing concerns regarding criminal penalties and state
licensing boards will likely result in physicians choosing other areas
of specialization—exacerbating the shortage of pain management
specialists.
B. Individual Moral Rights Justification
Individual moral rights justifications—or corrective justice
justifications in the case of tort liability—generally focus on
achieving justice between the parties. In the context of medical
malpractice, the corrective justice theory places the liability for a
patient’s injury on the negligent party in an attempt to make the
129
injured patient whole.
The individual moral rights justification
in medical malpractice also includes an aspect of the concept of
loss spreading: the doctor/hospital/insurance company is better
able to spread the expenses of an individual’s loss throughout
society, preventing an individual from having to bear a catastrophic
130
loss.
In the context of inadequate pain management, the basic
individual moral rights justification for expanding tort liability is
that the patient unnecessarily suffered pain that could have been
prevented but for the physician’s improper pain management. On
an individual basis there is an intuitive appeal to this theory
because if a physician is under an affirmative duty to relieve the
patient’s pain and this does not occur due to the physician’s
negligence, then holding the physician liable for the pain that
occurred is the only civilized way to achieve justice between the
parties. Thus, strictly in terms of a corrective justice theory,
inadequate pain management is a basis for tort liability.
However, in terms of compensation, “[m]ost analysts agree
that the medical liability system in the U.S., as a whole, ‘fail[s]
131
miserably’ as a method of compensating injured patients.”
The
128. See Jennifer Moody, The Physician Shortage is Official: Now What?, HEALTH
LEADERS NEWS (Jan. 12, 2004) (noting the Council of Graduate Medical Education
and the AMA reversed their longstanding positions on a physician surplus, both
now indicating physician shortages); see also Victoria Stagg Elliott, Physician Shortage
Predicted to Spread, AM. MED. NEWS 1 (Jan. 5, 2004).
129. Hottenroth, supra note 104, at 286.
130. See 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 759-64
(1956).
131. Hottenroth, supra note 104, at 286 (quoting Randall R. Bovberg, Medical
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majority of patients injured because of medical negligence never
132
In
file a claim or receive any compensation for their injury.
addition, the tort liability system is an expensive means of
performing the compensation function as the cost of investigation,
trial, and attorney’s fees substantially reduce the recovery of the
injured patient. When including the cost of the defense in the
equation, significantly more money is spent on administering the
medical malpractice tort and insurance system than is spent on
133
compensating injured patients.
One difficulty in applying the compensation theory to justify
tort liability for inadequate pain management is that pain is an
intangible loss; there is no way to accurately value suffering from
inadequately managed pain. This uncertainty in how to value pain
has led to large and dramatically inconsistent verdicts for pain and
134
suffering damages that are a part of other tort awards.
This has
also led some critics to question whether awards for pain and
135
suffering accomplish the stated goals of compensation. However,
if there is liability for inadequate pain management, then there is
136
no other form of damages that would compensate the patient.
Because money is the currency of our society, awarding money to
the injured party is a way for society to recognize the importance of
137
the injured party’s losses.
Accordingly, the purpose of tort
compensation for pain and suffering is not to compensate for the
injury so much as to acknowledge its value by “recognizing the
138
wrong and signifying its weightiness.”
Although it is difficult to
establish the value of suffering from pain, if a cause of action for
inadequate pain treatment were recognized, this factor would likely
be treated as an issue of fact for jury determination—as pain and

Malpractice on Trial: Quality of Care is the Important Standard, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 321, 326-28 (Spring 1986)).
132. See id. (stating “[A]s many as nine out of ten victims of medical negligence
never file a claim.”).
133. See id. at 287 (stating “[A]s little as twenty-eight cents of each insurance
premium dollar actually goes to compensate injured patients.”).
134. Jeffery C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using
Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 892 (1994).
135. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 658-60 (2d
ed. 1993).
136. Damages based upon an inadequate pain management theory would take
the place of pain and suffering damages in order to avoid a double recovery.
137. Dobbins, supra note 134, at 895.
138. Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56,
74 (1993).
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suffering damages currently are treated where pain and suffering is
139
only a component of the claim.
Although there is a valid corrective justice justification for
allowing the patient who unnecessarily suffered pain due to a
physician’s negligence to sue, the issue of whether there is an
individual moral rights justification for tort liability should focus
instead on the issue of compensation and whether suffering pain is
a loss that should be spread throughout society. Loss spreading is
the second major individual moral rights justification for tort
liability and it focuses on the inability of an individual to effectively
140
bear the full burden of another’s negligent action. In effect, tort
liability can operate as a form of insurance against loss, albeit an
expensive form of insurance. This justification is clearest when the
plaintiff is negligently injured resulting in additional losses:
medical expenses, lost income, lost property, etc. In the case of
inadequate pain management, it is not clear that pain alone
qualifies as a loss. In this situation, it is assumed that the patient’s
pain was preexisting and the physician’s negligent care did not
adequately alleviate the pain. At worst, the patient is in the same
position they were in before the physician treated them. In
addition, there is no loss of property, income, or additional
141
expenses involved with inadequate pain treatment. The reality of
medical malpractice insurance is that it is an expense that is
ultimately born by the consuming public at large. Physicians and
hospitals cover the additional expenses eventually through higher
reimbursement from patients’ insurance companies which results
in higher insurance premiums for patients. In the current era of
skyrocketing medical costs, it is questionable whether there is
adequate justification for society reimbursing patients for pain they
were already suffering. However, modern American society places
great value on quality of life, and pain is certainly an important
determinant of quality of life. Therefore, society may value a pain139. See 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ¶
18.02 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2003) (stating that the jury typically has
“broad discrection” in awarding damages for pain and suffering).
140. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 130, at 762-63.
141. However, it can be argued that the failure to treat pain could result in lost
wages if the patient was unable to work but would have been able to work with
adequate treatment. It could also be argued that failed pain treatment could
result in additional medical expenses as the patient attempts to have their pain
treated. However, both of these situations likely would not amount to damages
sufficient to warrant the expense of trial in order to recover. This leaves the real
issue to be valuing the pain that was unnecessarily suffered.
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free life highly enough to warrant reimbursing an individual who
unnecessarily suffered pain due to negligent pain management.
III. MISMANAGEMENT OF PAIN DOES NOT FIT WITHIN TRADITIONAL
CONCEPTS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
It is generally recognized that the elements of an action for
medical malpractice are: (1) the existence of a physician-patient
relationship giving rise to a duty; (2) a violation of the applicable
standard of care; (3) proof of injury or damage; and (4)
development of a causal relationship between the violation of the
142
standard of care and the harm. The first element is typically not
at issue as courts generally hold that a physician owes a legal duty of
143
However, the remaining elements
care to his or her patients.
could prove difficult to establish in a case of inadequate pain
management.
A. Standard of Care for Pain Management
The duty of a physician to exercise reasonable care is
measured against the “knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed and
exercised in similar situations by the average member of the
144
profession practicing in the field.” This is commonly referred to
as the “standard of care” that a physician’s conduct must conform
145
to in order to avoid being held negligent in a court of law.
This
“standard, recognizing that ‘medicine is not an exact science,’
holds physicians responsible for their negligence without making
146
them guarantors of the health of their patients.”
To satisfy this
standard a physician’s practice need only comply with the
147
customary practice of the average member of the profession. It is
significant to note that a physician usually is only liable for a
departure from the applicable standard of care, not for a mistake
in judgment of one appropriate alternative medical treatment over
148
another.
142. 3 J. D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND
LITIGATION § 25:1 (2d ed. 2002).
143. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 90.
144. Aiello v. Muhlenberg Reg’l Med. Ctr., 733 A.2d 433, 437 (N.J. 1999).
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Schueler v. Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577 (N.J. 1964)).
147. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 91.
148. 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 142, § 25:16. However, it is interesting to
note that many courts have begun to re-examine and reject the “good judgment
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Because the “standard of care” that a physician’s conduct
generally must conform to is determined by the customary practice
of the average physician, the standard of care for pain management
is currently very low because the average physician is still practicing
149
outdated pain management.
This is the source of the call for
courts to adopt medical practice guidelines for pain management
as the standard of care instead of relying upon the customary
150
practice of the average member of the profession.
However, as
discussed in Part II.A.1, the medical practice guidelines only
provide general guidance, not specific information of how an
individual situation should be treated. Thus, it is not reasonable to
base the standard of care solely on practice guidelines. The
practice guidelines could be useful in rebutting a physician’s claim
that they were worried about addiction. Additionally, guidelines
could be used in conjunction with expert testimony to illustrate the
inadequacies of a particular pain treatment plan. However, this
would require the court to disregard how average physicians deal
with pain.
B. Proving Pain as Damages
Proving pain with sufficient certainty to allow tort recovery
could be difficult for some suffers of pain that is medically
unexplainable or unquantifiable. “Damages for pain and suffering
151
. . . are recoverable where there is evidence of actual pain.” The
most common method of proving pain is through the plaintiff’s
own testimony and the testimony of other witnesses who relate
152
their observations of the plaintiff’s pain.
However, “[j]urors are
153
not compelled to find pain where there was no objective injury.”
In addition, jurors “are not obliged to believe that every injury
154
causes pain or the pain alleged.”
Thus, in situations where a
medical cause for the pain suffered can be clearly established, a
patient would likely be successful in proving pain with sufficient
rule.” See id. n.5 (citing various recent cases in which courts have rejected this
rule).
149. Rich, supra note 1, at 80.
150. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 95; Rich, supra note 1, at 81; Oken, supra
note 1, at 1975-77; Furrow, supra note 1, at 30.
151. 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ¶ 18.02
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2003).
152. Furrow, supra note 1, at 36.
153. Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 542 A.2d 516, 519 (Pa. 1988).
154. Id. at 518.
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certainty to meet this requirement. However, in situations where a
patient claims medically unexplainable pain or claims pain in
excess of what would medically be expected from a particular injury
or disease, a jury would have to make the same determination as
the treating physician regarding the veracity of the patient’s claims
of pain. It is questionable whether a patient with medically
unexplainable pain could prove the suffered pain with sufficient
certainty to allow tort recovery.
C. Causal Relationship Between Inadequate Treatment and Suffered Pain
“In medical malpractice cases, the general rule is that the
plaintiff must prove causation through medical expert testimony in
terms of probability to establish that the injury was, more likely
155
than not, caused by the defendant’s negligence.” However, there
are situations where traditional notions of proximate causation are
relaxed to permit recovery, such as where a patient is deprived of a
chance of recovery despite testimony establishing that the result
was inevitable regardless of the negligence of the physician (this is
156
known as the loss-of-chance theory).
In the typical tort case, pain and suffering is the result of a
157
physical injury to the plaintiff caused by the defendant.
Courts
are generally willing to instruct the jury on pain and suffering only
when the plaintiff has suffered a tangible injury due to the
defendant and a causal relationship is established between the
158
defendant’s negligence and the tangible injury.
In the medical
malpractice setting, pain due to a missed diagnosis resulting in a
lost opportunity to treat the problem can be a part of the
159
damages.
But failure to adequately treat pain is more
complicated: the physician is not responsible for the patient’s
condition or for a worsening of the patient’s condition, but instead
for pain mismanagement, which is the by-product of an underlying
160
disease.
Under traditional notions of causation, a physician
cannot be said to have caused the pain suffered by the patient
155. Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, 668 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ohio
1996).
156. Id.
157. Furrow, supra note 1, at 36.
158. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 142, § 3:2.
159. Id. § 25:85; see also Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (finding
ophthalmologist defendants liable when they failed to order a glaucoma test for
plaintiff leading to plaintiff losing part of her vision).
160. Furrow, supra note 1, at 36.
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simply because the physician negligently failed to treat the patient’s
pain. However, it is possible that a court would extend the
reasoning behind the loss-of-chance theory and relax the causation
requirement when it is clearly established that the plaintiff suffered
pain that was treatable and was only inadequately treated due to
the treating physician’s negligence.
IV. TORT LIABILITY WOULD COMPROMISE THE PHYSICIAN’S ROLE AS
GATEKEEPER FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
A. Physicians Are the Gatekeepers of Controlled Substances
Physicians have been legislatively placed in the role of the
gatekeeper for controlled substances through acts of Congress and
161
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In 1970, Congress
passed the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) that created a uniform
national standard for the control of potentially dangerous drugs
162
that have the potential for abuse. Under the CSA, in order for a
physician to prescribe and administer controlled substances, the
physician must apply to the DEA for a federal license for such
163
prescription and administration.
This license is separate from
the state license to practice medicine that physicians receive from
164
various state medical boards.
Prescriptions for controlled
substances are written by DEA licensees on special prescription
forms and require inclusion of the practitioner’s registration
number and signature with each controlled substance
165
166
prescription; refills are prohibited. The DEA requires that for a
controlled substance prescription to be effective, it “must be issued
for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner
167
acting in the usual course of his professional practice.”
“The
responsibility for the proper prescribing . . . of controlled

161. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2004).
162. Noah, supra note 37, at 58.
163. See Steven E. Stark, Bio-ethics and Physician Liability: The Liability Effects of
Developing Pain Management Standards, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 601, 623 (2002).
164. See id.
165. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.05(a) (2004). On January 4, 2005, the DEA amended 21
C.F.R. § 1306.05 and strengthened the restrictions and controls on controlled
substance prescriptions, requiring that the medical need be written on the
prescription. 70 Fed. Reg. 291, 292 (Jan. 4, 2005).
166. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12 (2004).
167. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2004).
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168

substances is upon the prescribing practitioner . . . .”
“The primary role of the DEA with respect to pharmaceutical
controlled substances is to prevent, detect, and investigate the
diversion from legitimate users, while ensuring their availability for
169
legitimate medical use.”
The DEA has authority to suspend or
revoke the license of practitioners who dispensed drugs in a
manner that threatens the public health and safety. “[A]ll of the
DEA’s policies, procedures, and investigation programs . . . are
guided by the underlying principles . . . that link the validity of
prescriptions for controlled substances to the requirement that it
170
be ‘issued for a legitimate medical purpose . . . .’”
The CSA divides drugs into five different schedules. Schedule
I drugs are defined as having a high abuse potential, having no
currently accepted medical use in the United States, and having a
171
lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision.
172
Examples of Schedule I substances are heroin and marijuana.
Schedule II drugs are considered to have an accepted medical use
and to have a high abuse potential that may lead to severe
173
psychological or physical dependence.
Schedule II substances
are some of the most frequently used for pain management:
174
morphine, Demerol, Percodan, and fentanyl.
Schedule III-V
substances are similar to Schedule II substances but are
characterized by progressively decreasing abuse potential in
175
comparison with the prior schedule.
B. Tort Liability for Pain Management Could Compromise Congressional
Intent
Congressional intent is clear that physicians should be
responsible for determining whether an individual’s condition
presents a legitimate medical purpose for prescribing a controlled
176
substance. Such a determination requires the physician to assess
168.
169.
623.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
related

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 106-378, at 2-3 (Oct. 13, 1999); Stark, supra note 163, at
Stark, supra note 163, at 623-24 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2004)).
21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2000).
Id.
Id. § 812(b)(2).
Rich, supra note 1, at 44-45.
21 U.S.C.S. § 812(b)(3)-(5) (Law. Co-op. 2004).
In the CSA, Congress specified factors to consider that were primarily
to the potential for abuse, rather than accepted medical use. See Noah,
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the severity and cause of the pain based on the patient’s reported
pain, medical history, and physical examination. The CSA,
arguably, would pre-empt state tort causes of action for inadequate
pain management that based liability on a physician’s decision to
prescribe or withhold controlled substances.
177
In Grier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Supreme Court, in a
5-4 decision, held that a state common-law tort action based on an
auto manufacturer’s failure to provide airbags was preempted by
178
the 1984 version of a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, with
which the manufacturer had complied. The Court held the tort
action was pre-empted because of conflict with the “means-related
179
federal objective” of the standard. The standard “deliberately
sought variety . . . allowing manufactures to choose among
different passive restraint mechanisms, such as airbags, automatic
180
belts, or other passive restraint technologies.”
The tort action,
the Court held, precluded choice by imposing a duty on the
181
manufacture to install airbags.
A state tort action for inadequate pain management might
arguably conflict with the congressional objective that CSA
regulated controlled substances be administered only after a
physician makes the determination that there is a legitimate
182
medical purpose to do so.
Allowing a jury to make the same
determination post-hoc creates a conflict because it will create an
outside influence on the physician’s medical judgment. The
183
defensive medicine phenomenon illustrates how the threat of
tort liability encourages physicians to make decisions that are
influenced by non-medical factors. Thus, the CSA would likely preempt state tort actions for inadequate pain management that
include a duty to prescribe controlled substances.

supra note 37, at 58 n.63.
177. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
178. 49 C.F.R. 571.208 (2004).
179. Grier, 529 U.S. at 881.
180. Id. at 878.
181. Id. at 881.
182. See 21 C.F.R. 1306.04(a) (2004).
183. See infra Part II.A.2.
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C. Physicians Should Have Qualified Immunity from Tort Liability for
the Decisions They Make in the Congressionally Imposed Role of Gatekeeper
of Controlled Substances
Physicians are often put in the position of having to judge the
honesty of patients’ claims of pain in order to prescribe narcotics.
This is not unlike the position government officials and judges are
in when they make decisions. “[G]overnment officials are entitled
to some form of immunity from suits for damages. . . . [P]ublic
officers require this protection to shield them from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats
184
of liability.”
Federal “qualified immunity shields government
officials performing discretionary functions ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
185
person would have known.’”
186
In Wilkinson v. Russell, state social workers were granted
qualified immunity from suit for an allegedly inadequate child
abuse investigation that violated settled standards of the profession
and wrongfully substantiated the mother’s allegations that the
187
father had sexually abused the child. State social workers did not
188
seek corroboration, relied on the opinion of a child psychiatrist
189
who had met the children only two or three times, and ignored
190
Despite these
evidence that the mother coached the child.
problems, the court concluded that the social workers had a
reasonable basis for their determination and therefore the
191
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were not violated.
This decision
was “in keeping with the basic precept that a mere failure to meet local
or professional standards, without more, should not generally be
192
elevated to the status of constitutional violation.”
There is a contractual relationship between the patient and
the physician: the physician is offering services to the public for
pay, not to the state for the public good; and the state has no
184. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
185. Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 686 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
186. 182 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999).
187. Id. at 92.
188. Id. at 100.
189. Id. at 105.
190. Id. at 101.
191. Id. at 106.
192. Id. (emphasis added).
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193

liability for the physician’s actions.
Nevertheless, physicians
perform what would otherwise be the role of a government official
194
by acting as gatekeepers for controlled substances. The physician
must determine the medical necessity of the prescription. To do
this, the physician may have to judge the honesty and truthfulness
of his or her patient: if the patient is deceiving the physician, the
prescription may not be medically necessary. In these situations,
there is potential for a difficult determination analogous to the
types of decisions for which government officials are regularly
granted qualified immunity.
Likewise, it is important that
physicians be shielded from “undue interference” in their decision
making regarding whether a patient should receive a controlled
substance. Such “undue interference” could interfere with a
physician making the congressionally-imposed legal decision that a
prescription for a controlled substance is medically necessary.
V. PAIN MANAGEMENT IN END-OF-LIFE CARE SITUATIONS
Tort liability for inadequate pain management may have the
most appeal in end-of-life situations in which the patient is
expected to live a short time and is suffering from severe pain.
Under such circumstances, physicians have less fear that opioids
195
will be diverted or abused.
However, administering opioids to
patients already weakened by terminal disease has the potential to
196
hasten death, typically through respiratory depression.
When a
physician prescribes opioids for a patient who has prohibited life
197
saving measures, that physician knows the opioids may hasten the
patient’s death. This decision may go against the moral and ethical
beliefs of the physician. Although the Supreme Court has held that
a patient has a right to palliative care, even if that care hastens

193. See LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 142, § 16:3 (government liability for the
actions or omissions of government employees limited to actions within the scope
of employment).
194. One alternative would be a system where the physician’s prescription
would have to be individually reviewed by a DEA employee to ensure that the
controlled substance would not be diverted or used for improper purpose. This
system of review would be similar to what some health insurance companies do
when they assign a caseworker to authorize physician decisions regarding health
care expenditures.
195. JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17.
196. Id. at 38, 41.
197. Such as a ventilator, if the patient stops breathing due to respiratory
depression.
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198

death, the Court did not hold an individual physician has an
affirmative duty to provide such care. Tort liability for inadequate
pain management has the potential to penalize a physician for
choosing, based on his or her own moral and ethical beliefs, not to
hasten patients’ deaths.
199
The case of Bergman v. Chin provides a good example of the
conflicting positions. At age eighty-five, Bergman was informed he
likely had terminal lung cancer. He refused further testing and
200
requested hospice care.
Bergman’s complaint charged Dr. Chin
with elder abuse for not adequately treating his pain while in the
hospital and for sending him home without adequate pain
201
medication.
Dr. Chin defended his decision to not use stronger
opioids, pointing out that Bergman “went into respiratory distress
202
and didn’t breathe for about 15 seconds” when he was given two
injections of morphine in the emergency room. Bergman also
complained that Dr. Chin’s ordered PRN use of opioids required
Bergman to suffer pain before receiving relief, and that Bergman’s
203
pain was never controlled while in Dr. Chin’s care.
Once
Bergman left the hospital and returned to the care of his family
physician, he was given the morphine that he requested and died
204
the next day. Dr. Chin was found liable for elder abuse, and the
205
jury awarded $1.5 million in damages.
The standard of proof in elder abuse cases is higher than in
medical malpractice cases. The physician’s conduct must be
reckless, rather than negligent, in order for him or her to be held
206
liable.
The jury did not indicate upon what basis Dr. Chin was
held liable, but the case provides an example of the conflict
between a physician’s duty to not harm the patient and the

198. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
199. No. H205732-1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2001) (jury form can be viewed
at http://www.compassionindying.org/bergman/verdict.pdf).
200. Susan Okie, Doctor’s Duty to Ease Pain at Issue in Calif. Lawsuit, WASH. POST,
May 7, 2001, at A03 (providing a thorough recount of Bergman’s situation),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com; see also Mayer, supra note 1, at 327-41.
201. Mayer, supra note 1, at 327-41.
202. Mark Crane, Now you may be liable for undertreating pain, MED. ECON. 1, 3
(2001), at http://www.compassionindying.org/bergman/medicalecon.pdf.
203. Mayer, supra note 1, at 330-32.
204. Okie, supra note 200.
205. Mayer, supra note 1, at 341.
206. Doctor Liable for not Giving Enough Pain Medication, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/13/elderabuse.lawsuit (last visited Jan. 23,
2005).
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patient’s right to be free from pain. In this case, Dr. Chin had
sound medical reasons for not providing stronger opioid
treatment, yet a jury found his behavior not merely negligent, but
207
reckless.
VI. CURRENT CHANGES WILL ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE PROBLEM
OF INADEQUATE PAIN MANAGEMENT
Inadequacy of the changes in pain management practices and
the need for discussions of ethical issues, are often cited as reasons
why tort liability for inadequate pain treatment is necessary to force
changes in pain management techniques and beliefs. However,
significant changes have occurred that will likely effectuate the
changes in pain management habits that are sought by tort liability
proponents without resorting to tort liability and the potential
problems tort liability presents for inadequate pain management.
A. Changes in Hospital Accreditation
Effective January 2, 2001, “the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) . . .
require[d] hospitals, homecare agencies, nursing homes,
behavioral health facilities, outpatient clinics, and health plans to
208
implement specific strategies to assess and manage pain.”
These
standards require healthcare providers to:
[1] Recognize the rights or patients to appropriate
assessment and management of pain . . . [2] Assess the
existence and . . . the intensity of pain in all patients . . .
[3] Record the results of the assessment in a way that
facilitates reassessment and follow-up . . . [4] Determine
and ensure staff competency in pain assessment and
management and address pain assessment that supports
the appropriate prescription of ordering of effective pain
management . . . [5] Establish policies and procedures
that support appropriate prescription or ordering of pain
medication . . . [6] Educate patients and their families
about effective pain management . . . [7] Include patients’
needs for symptom management in the discharge
207. This case also illustrates the dangers of putting a sympathetic plaintiff
who suffers pain in front of a jury and expecting a jury to evaluate a physician’s
pain treatment decision-making objectively. Bergman v. Chin, No. H205732-1
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2001).
208. Frank-Stromborg & Christensen, supra note 3, at 276-78.
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planning process . . . [8] Collect data to monitor the
209
appropriateness and effectiveness of pain management.
The JCAHO standards for pain management have the
potential to radically improve and change the treatment of pain at
the locations where severe pain is most likely to be suffered—in
hospitals and nursing homes. A common result of the new JCAHO
standard is that hospitals will take a multidisciplinary approach to
pain treatment that gives a voice to other groups in the hospital—
such as nursing and pharmacy—in creating a patient’s pain
210
Giving these other parties a say in a patient’s
treatment plan.
pain management plan prevents the opinion of an individual
physician from preventing a patient from receiving adequate pain
211
relief.
This also helps to ensure that the hospital’s policies that
have met the JCAHO accreditation standards are uniformly applied
212
to every patient in the institution.
While accreditation is voluntary, JCAHO accreditation can be
substituted for federal certification surveys that are required before
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement can be received;
additionally, JCAHO accreditation fulfills licensure requirements in
213
Thus, the majority of hospitals will implement the
many states.
214
JCAHO standards.
However, currently these standards will not
directly affect all cases of pain management that occur, because
physicians who do not work at regulated organizations are not
covered.
Looking to the future though, all physicians will
eventually be affected by the new standards because physicians are
only trained in accredited hospitals—hospitals that are required to
implement the new standards. Unfortunately, the new standards
have not been in place long enough to evaluate their direct effect
on pain management.
209. Id. at 276-77 (citing JCAHO Standards, 2001).
210. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations,
Improving the Quality of Pain Management Through Measurement and Action, at
http://www.jcaho.org/news+room/health+care+issues/pain+mono_jc.pdf (Mar.
2003).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Facts about the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization,
at http://www.jcaho.org/about+us/index.htm [hereinafter Facts about JCAHO]
(last modified July 2004).
214. See
Dennis
S.
O'Leary,
President’s
Message,
at
http://www.jcaho.org/about+us/president+message.htm (indicating that JCAHO
accredits more than 15,000 health organizations in the United States) (last visited
March 11, 2005).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

35

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 11
11BLAUFUSS.DOC

1128

3/13/2005 4:35:06 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

The JCAHO accreditation standards related to pain
management address the majority of the concerns cited by scholars
supporting the need for tort liability. One concern frequently cited
in support of tort liability for inadequate pain management is that
current medical school curriculums do not include any content
215
regarding pain management. Critics contend that tort liability is
necessary to force physicians to obtain training in current pain
216
The focus on medical school
management techniques.
curriculum may be misplaced however, because generally,
physicians learn their clinical practice methods through clinical
training obtained in hospitals and medical clinics during the last
two years of medical school and the three or more years of
217
residency training—not in a formal classroom style setting.
This
may be a significant factor in why advances in pain management
were not generally learned by new physicians: the physicians
training these new physicians did not practice using the advances in
pain management, so new physicians were not exposed to the
advances. However, subject to the new JCAHO requirements,
institutions that train new physicians will require all physicians
practicing there to follow guidelines that utilize the advances in
pain management—resulting in future generations of physicians
that do not perpetuate misconceptions regarding pain treatment
and opioid prescription.
The JCAHO accreditation standards for pain management also
address the often-cited concern that there needs to be a counterpressure to the factors that discourage physicians from prescribing
218
adequate opioids to relieve pain.
The JCAHO standards address
this concern because for most physicians to practice medicine in a
hospital or other healthcare institution, they will be required to
219
meet these standards.
While not all physicians have admitting
privileges in a hospital or other healthcare facility are covered by
the JCAHO standards, the majority of physicians who deal with
significant pain will be, especially in the case of terminal pain as
215. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 28, 33-34; Rich, supra note 1, at 10; Oken,
supra note 1, at 1933; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 88.
216. Id.
217. See generally Physician Education for a Changing Health Care Environment,
Council on Graduate Medical Education, Thirteenth Report (Mar. 1999), at
http://www.cogme.gov/13.pdf.
218. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 28-29; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 89.
219. See Facts about JCAHO, supra note 213 (indicating that the majority of
hospitals will implement the JCAHO standards).
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these patients usually end up in the hospital. Because many
physicians do practice in hospitals and other healthcare institutions
that are accredited under JCAHO, the requirements that the
physicians comply with the institution’s pain management
standards will effectively force these physicians to bring their
practice into compliance with the standards. In addition, as
hospitals and other large healthcare institutions are required to
implement these changes, they in turn have the potential to be
powerful political voices to effectuate necessary changes in state
medical boards and federal agency standards and policies which
unreasonably inhibit pain relief.
This form of change has a high success probability because the
medical profession is driving it internally. The determination of
whether an individual should receive opioids for pain relief is,
220
legally speaking, strictly a medical decision.
In addition,
institutional review of an individual’s action in regard to individual
cases of pain mismanagement should result in efficient correction
of problems, preventing repeated problems and giving an effective
medium for aggrieved patients to voice their concerns regarding an
individual physician. This may not be as vindicating for the
individual’s rights as winning a judgment in court, but it has
greater potential to effectuate meaningful change rapidly and with
less confrontation than recovering damages in a civil trial.
A final issue that will be effectively addressed by the JCAHO
accreditation standards is the concern that the courts need to set
the standard of care based on recommended practice guidelines
221
instead of current national physician practices.
The JCAHO
accreditation standards regarding pain management effectively
force most hospitals and healthcare facilities to implement current
222
practices in pain management in the care their patients receive.
This will inevitably change the clinical pain management practices
of the majority of physicians in the country. Once this has
220. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2004) (physician is responsible for determining
the medical necessity for controlled substance to be prescribed).
221. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 32-33; Rich, supra note 1, at 81-83.
222. See Facts about JCAHO, supra note 213; Joint Commission Focuses on Pain
Management, at http://www.hcaho.org/news+room/health+care+issues/jcaho+
focuses+on+pain+management.htm (Aug. 3, 1999).
JCAHO’s current
accreditation standards include current practice in pain management. JCAHO
accredits most hospitals and health care facilities. For these hospitals to remain
accredited, they have to meet JCAHO’s requirements regarding pain
management, resulting in the adoption of JCAHO’s pain management standards
in most hospitals and health care facilities. See Facts about JCAHO, supra note 213.
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occurred, courts will only have to look to the national standard of
care to determine if a physician has been negligent in relieving
pain. Thus, there is no need for a legislature or judge to take the
determination of an appropriate standard of care of pain
management away from the nation’s practicing physicians.
B. Changes in State Regulation of Medicine
“Many states are attempting to address pain management
concerns through their legislatures by enacting new laws or by
223
In addition, “the
making changes to current laws.”
undertreatment of pain is being addressed [in some states] by
enacting administrative rules and guidelines or by enforcing these
224
rules more diligently.”
For example, California has passed a bill
“requiring all California doctors to take a pain management
225
course.” The law “also requires that the state medical board track
complaints of doctors mishandling pain care and ensure that those
226
complaints are reviewed by a pain specialist.”
In addition, the
Supreme Court’s rulings on physician-assisted suicide in Washington
227
228
v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill have “prompted state legislatures
to enact new and revise existing intractable pain statutes, which are
designed to encourage the administration of opioid analgesics and
229
other controlled substances in appropriate circumstances.”
“At
present, a majority of states have in place laws that directly address
230
pain management issues and many have enacted more than one.”
As an example, Minnesota has directly addressed the issue of
pain management in several statutes. Minnesota’s Intractable Pain
231
Treatment Act addresses physicians fears of regulatory scrutiny
for the prescription of controlled substances by stating that “[n]o
physician shall be subject to disciplinary action by the Board of
Medical Practice for appropriately prescribing or administering a
controlled substance . . . in the course of treatment of an individual
232
for intractable pain. . . .”
Furthermore, Minnesota’s Criminal
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Frank-Stromborg & Christensen, supra note 3, at 277.
Id.
Mayer, supra note 1, at 348.
Id. at 349.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
521 U.S. 793 (1997).
Oken, supra note 1, at 1964.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 152.125 (2003).
Id. § 152.125, subd. 2.
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Code shields healthcare providers from a charge of aiding suicide
or aiding attempted suicide for prescribing opioids to treat a
patient’s pain “unless the medications . . . are knowingly
233
administered . . . to cause death.”
Thus, significant changes have occurred and continue to
occur. These changes are improving pain management without
resorting to tort liability.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is obvious that many physicians’ pain management practices
are out-of-date and largely ineffective. However, the myopic view
that tort liability for inadequate pain management is necessary to
improve the treatment of pain in the United States fails to consider
all of the implications of such liability. This limited view also fails
to consider how other changes in the healthcare system might
accomplish effective pain management strategies. In addition,
although there are studies that indicate that opioids are not as
234
addictive as many physicians fear, these studies are generally
235
limited to patients suffering from cancer pain.
236
The rapid growth in the abuse of painkillers substantiates
physicians’ fears of over-prescribing opioids. Pain management is
too complex of an issue to be guided by a simple declaration that a
physician has a duty to relieve a patient’s pain. Such a duty has the
potential to drastically reduce the availability of physicians
providing pain relief for their patients by creating a professionally
untenable situation. An attempt to use clinical practice guidelines
to impose a standard of care that does not reflect the practices of
the average physician could result in a flood of litigation given the
sheer number of people in the United States who suffer from
inadequately controlled pain. In contrast, by using existing
changes in the accreditation of hospitals, the goal of improving
pain relief can be achieved without implicating the problems
associated with tort liability. Before imposing a new form of tort
liability, a court or legislature should look beyond the interests of
the parties directly impacted by the new tort and examine the
overall impact on society. In the case of inadequate pain

233.
234.
235.
236.

MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subd. 3 (2003).
See JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17.
See id.
See 2002 Drug Survey, supra note 45 and accompanying text.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

39

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 11
11BLAUFUSS.DOC

1132

3/13/2005 4:35:06 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

management, the balance is tipped to a finding that tort liability is
unnecessary and restrictive—society does not gain enough benefit
to outweigh the cost such liability would impose.
However, this balance could change in the future. Once the
average physician’s pain management practices are in line with
recommended guidelines, it is possible that tort liability for
inadequate pain management could be socially useful in some
situations. For example, in end-of-life care, there is not a justifiable
concern about diversion of opioids, especially if a professional
caregiver administers the opioids. The only valid concern would be
the moral and ethical dilemma created by the potential for
hastening a patient’s death. As long as the laws governing tort
liability expressly recognize that a physician is not required to
provide pain relief that could be potentially harmful, it is possible
that tort liability could serve a socially useful function by helping to
ensure that physician negligence does not result in unnecessarily
painful, avoidable deaths.
In the situation of acute or non-terminal chronic pain, it is
unlikely that tort liability for inadequate pain management could
exist without compromising the impartiality required by Congress
to ensure that controlled substances are not diverted for improper
use. Any type of liability could be used by a “drug seeker” to exert
pressure on a physician to prescribe controlled substances and
would likely be pre-empted by federal drug control laws.
Today, there is insufficient justification for tort liability for
inadequate pain management.
Thus, inadequate pain
management should continue as is—a form of damage that the tort
system does not recognize.
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